“The Russian Threat”: Chatham House Published a Guide on How to Destabilise Moldova
The recipes of British analysts for the fight against Russia…
For Moldova the report of the London-based Chatham House (also known as the Royal Institute of International Affairs), which, together with Belarus and Ukraine, British experts place in the ranks of the countries that are allegedly “at the forefront of the fierce fight for the future”, contains many interesting things.In London donors are aiming to finance projects that are aimed against Russia (it is claimed that the “fight for the future” consists of exactly this).
And if Ukraine after the coup of 2014 became a “laboratory for the West” (using Chatham House’s own terminology), and for Belarus, according to the British analysts, “a turning point came”, then with Moldova it is more difficult – Moldavians, it is said in the report, “a captive audience for Russia’s propaganda”, and the state has a legitimacy crisis.
And therefore, the possibilities that the Anglo-Saxons possess concerning the fight against Russia using the hands of Moldavians are “limited”, but London hasn’t lost hope: it advises to rely on information campaigns, to take root in educational programs, and to continue to support “civil society”. In general, “strengthening the leverage of Western assistance”.
Chatham House notes that 50% of the population of Moldova is the so-called Russian sphere: here there are both ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Gagauz. London is dissatisfied not only with the fact that the people in Moldova are clearly not against the Russian world, but also that the “current leadership, in the hands of Vlad Plahotniuc and his Democratic Party, is not presenting Russian influence as a potential threat to sovereignty”.
Of course, Plahotniuc is trying to ride on the obstinate “Russian threat” horse, but he hasn’t yet decided to follow Poroshenko’s example of dressing up in camouflage and staging any provocation in Transnistria – here the British analysts don’t see reliable support in him for the deployment of the “fierce fight”. Like in Donbass, for example.
And since the Moldavian authorities are “not construing Russia as a threat to Moldova’s sovereignty, an increasingly endangered civil society has little scope for meaningful resistance”, concludes Chatham House.
Moldavian politicians are not in a hurry to adopt the Ukrainian experience because, probably, the lessons of the armed conflict of 1992 haven’t been forgotten. And if in Ukraine nowadays “civil society” is understood, first of all, as paramilitary formations and a network of volunteer organisations working for war, in Moldova no such thing is present, which disturbs London.
The political sphere is named as one of the key “vulnerabilities” of Moldova in the report of Chatham House.
President Igor Dodon and the socialists (PSRM), who “who are the mainstay of Russian political influence in the country” and the current, “nominally pro-European” leadership of the country, are exercising power for selfish purposes.
“There is a symbiotic relationship of sorts between the Democratic and Socialist parties: the Democrats legitimize themselves by proclaiming their European orientation and defining themselves in opposition to the Socialists, who in turn use the Democrats as a convenient ‘public enemy’ to win support for their own pro-Russia agenda,” consider the British analysts.
The political competition in Moldova, including the forces that defend the strengthening of Moldavian-Russian relations, also prevents them from fighting against Russia. In Ukraine they practically got rid of such “competitors” – only politicians whose eyes were turned to the west and lips continuously go on about “Russian aggression” can seriously fight for power in Ukraine. In Ukraine declaring friendship with the Russian Federation in an electoral program is state treason and a long prison term.
But in Moldova “the state has no willingness to implement positive change in respect of Russian influence in the country, as Moscow’s agenda is presented not as a problem per se but as part of a wider political narrative in which different vested interests are pitted against each other,” considers Chatham House.
For London, carrying out a Maidan in Chisinau seems to be impossible, since the existing NGOs work for the acting politicians, while the West prefers to deal with social movements and activists who fulfil (for money) the task of strengthening foreign influence in the country. Like in Ukraine, where “independent” organisations promote the continuation of the conflict in the East of the country (it is described as “war with Russia”). Or, like in Belarus, where through “civil society” the idea of a non-Russian identity under the name of “soft Belarusianization” is imposed on the population.
The next “vulnerability” of Moldova is the media. “Eighty-five per cent of Moldovans take their information from TV, and 57 per cent consider it as their main source of information; about 40 per cent consider it the most trustworthy source of information … up to 70% of Moldovans follow the news on Russian mass-media outlets,” calculated London.
They also noted that “trust in Russian media has been broadly stable, while trust in national media is declining sharply every year”. “For Russian media, the level of trust was 55.5 per cent in 2013, 54 per cent in 2015 and 50 per cent in May 2018. In contrast, the public’s confidence in national media has plummeted, from 62.5 per cent of those surveyed in 2013 to 42.5 per cent in 2015; confidence was at 40 per cent in May this year,” it is said in the 2018 report of Chatham House.
Now it is clear where the law approved by the parliament of Moldova concerning television and radio, which came into force from January 1st 2019, came from – this law forbids the relaying of Russian TV channel information programs and obliges suppliers of audiovisual services (television and radio) to buy no less than 50% of programs from European Union countries and those who have signed the European Convention on Transfrontier Television. The law was adopted by 56 votes of the parliamentary majority on the order of Vlad Plahotniuc.
In Moldova they allegedly found a way to rein in Moldavian television, but London call’s this law “a token gesture designed to placate the international community and increase US and EU support for Plahotniuc”. It’s like saying that the ban “doesn’t apply to print media and the Internet, and it also doesn’t concern the relaying of Russian talk-shows and information entertainment programs”.
And meanwhile, the residents of Moldova are “actively present” on the social networks “Odnoklassniki” and “VKontakte” – especially in numerous groups with a focus on the “glorification of the Soviet past, promotion of the ‘Russian world’ concept and compatriot policy, and classical anti-Western rants”.
The British analysts are also disturbed by the Moldavian office of the Sputnik agency, which in 2017 accounted for about 12.7% of local Internet traffic.
And here how is it not possible to again remember the “laboratory for the West” – Ukraine, where freedom of speech is limited by bans on Russian television, press, social networks, and online publications.
“Moreover, it is widely understood that Plahotniuc personally controls the Audiovisual Coordination Council and owns most of the advertising companies working in the media sphere. The oligarchic nature of the media space creates favourable conditions for the dissemination of malign Russian information, especially since there is no system for the protection of information security in Moldova,” wrote an upset London.
They would like to be the conductor, but Plahotniuc doesn’t allow them, since he seemingly watches very attentively the destiny of the Ukrainian leaders who trusted the West too much: one of them was illegally discharged from power and forced to flee the country, and concerning another (an especially obedient doll), judging by his approval rating, huge problems with holding onto power started to be outlined.
The Moldavian oligarch isn’t in a hurry to repeat their mistake: although he also pushes thresholds in Europe and the US in search of support, but isn’t going to put the reins of the country in the hands of the Americans and the British, and this hasn’t escaped the attention of the experts of Chatham House.
The report mentions the “StopFals!” platform, which works “on the same basis as StopFake in Ukraine” and is supported by USAID, as an achievement in the fight against “Russian influence”. However, the British analysts write that it doesn’t “primarily address Russian information warfare and propaganda in Moldova, but rather centres on internal politics”.
London see the third Moldavian “vulnerability” (like in the Belarusian and Ukrainian ones) as “winning hearts and minds through the Russian Orthodox Church”.
“The Moldovan Orthodox Church, which is subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church, is an active vector for Russian influence and propaganda in Moldova. It accounts for 80 per cent of religious believers and is the most trusted institution in the country, with opinion polling indicating that 70 per cent of respondents consider it trustworthy,” say Chatham House in the report.
London has a mass of pretensions to the Moldavian Metropolitanate of the Russian Orthodox Church: promotion of anti-western values, supporting president Dodon, and the pro-Russian spirit of the “church authorities” in Transnistria.
Because of the highest level of trust in society towards the Moldovan Orthodox Church, for “civil society” (i.e., for NGOs on the leash of their donors) “denouncing the Church would mean losing credibility and risk alienating the population”. A Ukrainian-esque sabbath is impossible: “politicians are unable to interfere in
religious matters”. That’s why, Chatham House urges NGOs to work extremely carefully: “without attracting undue pushback, to reach out to young, pro-European and more liberal priests to promote a more progressive voice within the Church”.
In other words, it is planned to quietly undermine Orthodoxy in Moldova, from within, in the districts.
What does Chatham House recommend to the donors financing “civil society” in Moldova?
1. Don’t wait for quick results, but develop a strategy for a decade, a “long-term agenda”.
2. Focus efforts and funds on the training of journalists and large-scale information programs to “combat fake news”. Moreover, it will be necessary to reorient similar projects that already exist in Moldova from domestic to anti-Russian politics, notes London.
3. Like in Belarus, the experts of Chatham House predict that creeping into the education system – into schools and universities – with the help of “media literacy” projects and the development of critical thinking will give the “best chances of success”.
“This will require reform of the education sector, to make tuition in these areas not only systematic but mandatory”4. Develop anti-Russian projects in rural areas (especially in Transnistria and Gagauzia), in the youth segment of social networks, in the Russian-speaking environment.
it is specified in the report
5. Support “independent” media projects with “alternative content”, having focused on social advertising and entertaining information; Finance such TV channels as TV8 that serve as an alternative to the mass media in the Russian, Gagauz, and Ukrainian languages.
6. Engage the pro-West Moldavian diaspora, whose representatives overwhelmingly voted for the candidate Maia Sandu at the 2016 presidential elections in Moldova.
7. Rely on regional NGOs, which, “especially in the country’s regions, are therefore paramount to strengthening resilience from the ground up”. This is referring to topics that are important for citizens – social policies, government corruption, human rights, and so on.
8. Create a network of Moldavian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian NGOs for the exchange of “valuable insights and examples of best practices” in the field of countering Russia.
9. Engage in religious projects that are aimed against the Orthodox Church, Catholics, Uniates, Protestants, and sectarians.
10. Western politicians are recommended to visit the regions of Moldova more often to “engage” with local NGOs and the media.
Chatham House also has advice for the EU as a whole: don’t just give loans to the government of Moldova, but also accompany them with bright stories of success. “It needs to do more to claim full ownership of its development assistance and highlight the positive impact of its engagement on the ground” – such is the advice of the British analysts. The EU is asked to inflate advertising soap bubbles, convincing the citizens of Moldova that the pro-European course is better than the pro-Russian one.
At the same time, London calls for “rethinking the future of the Eastern Partnership” so that Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova have a common vision on this topic. And the project itself should be adapted for each of the three countries and should also be orientated towards a decade. London considers that in ten years the West will manage to lead both Belarus and Moldova to the condition of Ukraine and to ensure that the Ukrainian anti-Russia project inspired, rather than frightens, Belarusians and Moldavians/Gagauz.
But in the meantime neither Lukashenko, nor Dodon, nor Plahotniuc want to walk along the path of Poroshenko. It is amusing that the analysts of Chatham House don’t recommend considering the latter to be a “son of a bitch” in the West. “European countries and the US should limit their interactions with consultants and lobbying groups working for Vlad Plahotniuc in Brussels and Washington,” it is said in the report.
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